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BRIEF REMARKS ON THE SUPREME






N thinking about what I might say on the topic of civil liberties after
9/11, an idea that occurred to me was to give a snapshot of the Su-
preme Court's role in the perceived tug-of-war between national se-
curity and individual rights,1 arising out of the "war on terror."'2 How has
the Court responded to the government's positions? And in what ways
has it attempted to strike the proper balance under the Constitution?
The Suipreme Court decisions are long and, at points, exceedingly tech-
nical. But I think there are a couple of themes we can pull out, and in
doing so, frame a discussion about how best to manage this apparent ten-
sion between government's duty to make this country safe on the one
hand, and its obligation to keep this country as free as possible on the
other.
Before we get to how the Court has grappled with the individual rights/
national security question, 3 however, it is important to appreciate its con-
* Assistant Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law. I would like to thank
the Dallas and SMU Law School chapters of the American Constitution Society for invit-
ing me to give these remarks, and the SMU Law Review for offering to publish them. I
would also like to thank Harlan Cohen, Evan Criddle, Jeff Kahn, and Robert D. Sloane for
very helpful comments and conversations. Kristina Kiik provided characteristically excel-
lent research and editing assistance.
1. There has been criticism of framing the issue this way. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin,
Terror & the Attack on Civil Liberties, N.Y. REV. OF BooKs, Nov. 7, 2003, at 37.
2. I use this term as a convenience without entering the debate on whether "war," in
either the constitutional or international legal sense, is an accurate legal description of the
struggle against transnational terrorist groups generally. For an excellent critique of the
terms "war on terror" and "war on terrorism," see Robert D. Sloane, Prologue to a Volun-
tarist War Convention, 106 MICH. L. REV. 443, 446-48 & nn.19-22 (2007).
3. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) ("It is beyond question that
substantial interests lie on both sides of the scale in this case."); id. at 545 (Souter, J.,
concurring) ("For reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of the Government
asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch on which to rest the Nation's entire
reliance in striking the balance between the will to win and the cost in liberty on the way to
victory; the responsibility for security will naturally amplify the claim that security legiti-
mately raises. A reasonable balance is more likely to be reached on the judgment of a
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stitutional dimensions. The question is not simply a free-floating policy
determination about what is the best balance to strike here, but also asks
to whom-which branch, or branches, of government-does the Consti-
tution entrust to strike it? The national security/individual rights ques-
tion, in other words, exists against a background of separation of powers
among the different branches of government to whom the Constitution
entrusts different responsibilities: to the political branches the power to
wage war to protect the nation, and to the judiciary the power to guaran-
tee individual rights against government overreaching.
Two themes that I think emerge from the Supreme Court decisions are
that: (i) the Court has rejected the broad powers the government claimed
for itself to draw bright-line categories or labels that purport to cut off
individual rights-what I would call "legal conversation-stoppers"; and
(ii) the Court, in trying to resolve apparent tensions between individual
rights and national security, has sought not to create clear, categorical
substantive rules. Instead, it has adopted methodologies by which the na-
tional security/individual rights balance can be carefully weighed based
on the particular circumstances of a particular case-methodologies that
are essentially balancing tests in themselves-or what I would call "legal
conversation-starters. "
I. THE GOVERNMENT'S LEGAL CONVERSATION-STOPPERS
On this first point, what do I mean by "legal conversation-stoppers"? I
mean that the government, in supporting its policies in the war on terror,
has attempted to interpose some concept or label that, the government
claims, is both uniquely political (as opposed to judicial) in nature and
basically stops the legal conversation about constitutional rights.
Let's take Hamdi first. Hamdi was captured by the Northern Alliance
after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan following 9/11 and turned over to
U.S. forces. 4 Because of his U.S. citizenship, he was eventually trans-
ferred to a military prison in the United States.5 He challenged his deten-
tion through the writ of habeas corpus in the courts.6 The government's
argument was that it could detain Hamdi without formal charges or pro-
ceedings because it had determined he was an "enemy combatant."'7 Here
the label "enemy combatant" was the legal conversation-stopper. The
government's position was: we alone have the power to determine who is
and is not an enemy combatant, and that determination cannot be "sec-
ond-guessed" by the courts. 8 The Supreme Court rejected this position.9
different branch .. "); id. at 578 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Founders well understood
the difficult tradeoff between safety and freedom.").
4. Id. at 510.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 511.
7. Brief for the Respondents at 9-10, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No.
03-6696).
8. Id. at 12.
9. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 532.
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Instead of deferring to the government's position, the Court weighed in
and held that Hamdi had some procedural right, under the Fifth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause, to challenge the government's classification
of him as an enemy combatant and, thus, his detention based on that
classification. 10
The government also attempted to block the legal conversation in the
recent Boumediene case, which involved the constitutional reach of the
writ of habeas corpus to non-citizens detained at Guantgnamo Bay,
Cuba." Here the legal conversation-stopper was the concept of "sover-
eignty." The government argued that because the United States does not
have sovereignty over Guantinamo, habeas corpus does not constitution-
ally extend there for non-citizens. 12 And how, you may ask, do we tell
when U.S. sovereignty exists? Well, the government said, it exists when
we say it does.
In fact, the government argued that the question of sovereignty is
what's called a "political question"-that is to say, a question to be an-
swered completely by the political branches, and their answer is not sub-
ject to judicial review.' 3 In turn, "sovereignty" has no legal content other
than political-branch fiat. And because a political branch instrument-
the lease between the United States and Cuba relating to Guantdnamo -
says very clearly that while the United States has complete jurisdiction
and control over the territory, "Cuba has ... sovereignty," 14 that, in itself,
ends the legal conversation about the geographic scope of habeas corpus.
As in Hamdi, the Court in Boumediene rejected the conversation-stop-
per, weighed directly in on the question of individual rights in the war on
terror, and announced a set of judicially-enforceable criteria-namely, a
"functional approach" to the extraterritorial scope of the writ-that
brought within its coverage the petitioners in Boumediene.15
II. THE COURT'S LEGAL CONVERSATION-STARTERS
Yet in these two cases the Court really only just began the relevant
legal conversations. The Court's solution in both Hamdi and Boumediene
to the question of how best to strike the national security/individual rights
balance was not to give a firm substantive rule of decision but rather to
propose a methodology for courts to use in resolving the particular cases
before them. The methodology would then guide lower courts to fashion
decisions on a case-by-case basis and promote rulings narrowly tailored
to the specific facts of the case at hand. As Cass Sunstein has explained,
10. Id. at 528-29.
11. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2247 (2008).
12. Brief for the Respondents at 33-36, Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (Nos. 06-1195, 06-
1196).
13. Id. at 35 (citing Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) ("Who is the
sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory, is not a judicial, but a political question.").
14. Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba, art. III , Feb. 23, 1903,
T.S. No. 418.
15. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2258.
2009]
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such "minimalist," narrow, fact-specific rulings have been prominent dur-
ing wartime, and are no less so in the contemporary war on terror.a6
In Hamdi, while a plurality of the Court held that Hamdi had a proce-
dural due process right to challenge his classification as an enemy com-
batant, a7 the contours of that right depended on the particular factual
circumstances of his case. The plurality used the Mathews balancing test,
which balances the private interest affected by government action against
the government's interest, including the function involved and the bur-
dens the government would face in providing greater process, and then
takes these and evaluates them in light of the risk of error in existing
procedures plus the probable value of additional procedures. 18 As the
mere articulation of this test reveals, it is going to be an extremely fact-
sensitive inquiry. And indeed, based on the facts of Hamdi, the plurality
opinion observed that while he had some due process right, that right did
not guarantee the full-blown procedures that attend ordinary criminal tri-
als but something less, such that the government might be able to intro-
duce hearsay evidence against him and might even have a presumption in
its favor.19
In Boumediene, the Court similarly used a very fact-sensitive test to
measure the geographic scope of habeas corpus. Just as it did not accept
the government's bright-line sovereignty test, it did not say that habeas
extends to all persons in U.S. custody around the globe. 20 Rather, the
majority set forth a "functional approach" to the scope of the writ which
evaluates the status of the persons detained; the process through which
that status determination was made; the nature of the locations where
apprehension and detention occur; and practical obstacles to extending
the writ there.21 This too allows for fact-sensitive evaluation of the partic-
ular circumstances in a particular case to resolve national security/individ-
ual rights tensions.
Now neither of these methodologies necessarily precludes the govern-
ment's arguments that there might be cases unqualified for further judi-
cial monitoring 22-cases where the conversation might reach a very quick
end because the Court defers to the political branches. Hamdi and
Boumediene certainly appear to leave open the possibility of the Court
accepting a conversation-stopper in some circumstances when striking the
national security/individual rights balance. But such acceptance would oc-
cur only after the judiciary has evaluated those circumstances under the
relevant legal standards and has itself deemed the conversation at an end.
16. See Cass R. Sunstein, National Security, Liberty, and the D.C. Circuit, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 693, 693 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 Sup. C. REV.
47, 51 [hereinafter Sunstein, Minimalism at War].
17. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004).
18. Id. at 529 (2004) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
19. Id. at 533-34.
20. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262.
21. Id. at 2259 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777 (1950)).
22. I am indebted to Jeff Kahn for pointing this out.
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What makes the conversations in such cases legal, rather than political,
may simply boil down to opportunity for judicial participation.
For instance, Hamdi left open the possibility that the procedures it sug-
gested could lead to a judicial stamp of approval on the government's
"enemy combatant" label in a given case, effectively ending further con-
versation about the status, and the ability to challenge that status, of
those detained.23 Similarly, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent in
Boumediene, there invariably will be some situations of extraterritorial
detention that don't meet the criteria necessary for constitutional access
to the writ of habeas corpus under the Boumediene majority's functional
approach.24 To be sure, according to the Boumediene majority, the func-
tional approach is consistent with Johnson v. Eisentrager, a World War II-
era precedent where the Court denied constitutional habeas rights to
German soldiers detained in Allied-occupied Germany.25 Of course, once
the judiciary concludes that a situation of extraterritorial detention falls
outside the constitutional scope of the writ, that conclusion can be tanta-
mount to ending further legal conversation about the rights of those de-
tained. Hence, the result may well be the same as that prescribed by the
government's conversation-stopper argument. The difference is that the
judiciary participates in making that call, not just the political branches.
Courts would apply the relevant legal criteria and conclude that the cir-
cumstances warrant a degree of deference to the political branches so
large that further judicial monitoring would be inappropriate.
Perhaps this looks like a variation on the political question doctrine,
under which the judiciary abstains altogether if it determines the question
at issue is political. 26 Though here the initial determination appears more
rigorous and fact-intensive, and seems subject to broader, more searching
judicially-enforceable criteria. Put another way, even when the judiciary
ultimately defers to the political branches, an initial conversation must
take place between the political branches and the courts-as opposed to,
for instance, the executive just talking into the mirror.
Finally, it may be worth noting that while it's surely conceivable that
the Court could defer completely to the government's positions under the
methodologies discussed above, it has not. That is, it has not yet opted to
stop the conversation. In fact, the Court has gone out of its way to keep
the conversation going. The irony here is that judicial review is itself often
criticized for being a sort of conversation-stopper. By constitutionalizing
what would otherwise be political judgments, the Court arguably stops
the political conversation over controversial subjects. Yet here, we can
see the opposite dynamic occurring: by guarding the constitutional
dimensions of the war on terror from political conversation-stoppers, the
23. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538-39.
24. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2302 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 2258 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)).
26. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (noting that the political question doc-




Court actually facilitates ongoing public deliberation over the national
security/individual rights balance. 27
III. IMPLICATIONS AND QUESTIONS
The conversations the Court began about the contours of individual
rights in the war on terror remain anchored in separation-of-powers con-
cerns. As a result, they still must be sketched out in more detail, and
given color and texture, by arguments about institutional competence and
appropriate deference to coordinate branches of government.2 8 Yet all of
this raises important predicate questions about where and how those
competence arguments are made and resolved. In short, before we can
get to the second-order questions of what precisely habeas procedures for
non-citizens abroad in the war on terror should look like, or what pre-
cisely constitutes a location where habeas constitutionally extends in
favor of such persons, we must confront first-order questions about who
should be making those calls. And here, the Supreme Court has done
something quite interesting, perhaps unsettling, and, just maybe, wise. It
has delegated the task to the lower courts.
Giving lower courts fact-specific methodologies to iron out and apply
on a case-by-case basis raises a host of intriguing separation of powers
issues. Is the Court abdicating its role by refusing to give more guidance?
Is it leaving space to encourage Congress and the President to act within
established limits? Or is it taking more power for the courts, giving lower
courts the wide-ranging task of making assessments over liberty/security
balances? 29
Whatever else it may be doing, the Court certainly seems to have hit
upon a way to keep the conversation going. Announcing a set of firm
substantive rules from on high could prove both troublingly under- and
over-inclusive. 30 Instead of having to craft a rule that could distinguish
and prescribe cleanly on its own the procedures appropriate for the "en-
emy combatant" captured in the field of battle firing at U.S. soldiers, and
the "enemy combatant" geographically distant from any battlefield and
turned over to U.S. forces by his local law enforcement agency for a
bounty, the Court can simply let lower courts hash out the appropriate
procedures based on the facts of particular cases. The same goes for figur-
27. 1 am indebted to Evan Criddle for this insight.
28. Indeed, the Court has also been keen to insist upon congressional participation
when deprivations of liberty are at stake in the war on terror. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Congress has denied the President the
legislative authority to create military commissions of the kind at issue here. Nothing pre-
vents the President from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes
necessary.").
29. I am indebted to Harlan Cohen for raising these questions.
30. See also Sunstein, Minimalism at War, supra note 16, at 106 ("[Sluppose that the
law is not clear and that a deep or wide ruling might be confounded by unanticipated
circumstances. If so, there is every reason for federal judges to issue shallow and narrow
opinions, refusing to freeze the future and allowing decisions to turn on particular
circumstances.").
[Vol. 62
The Supreme Court's Role after 9/11
ing out when habeas applies abroad: let the lower courts juggle myriad
considerations like status, location of capture and detention, and vague
practical obstacles to extending the writ to a particular location, and then
reach appropriate results on the peculiar combination of facts presented.
Perhaps at some point the rulings and rationales of the various cases will
organically congeal into a workable, coherent, and sufficiently predict-
able framework for confronting the essential question of individual rights
in the war on terror. But for the time being, the Court may be asking that
we satisfy ourselves with flexible methodologies designed to help achieve
just results in particular cases.
There are, however, costs. For individuals, this jurisprudential ap-
proach has led to a highly objectionable delay of meaningful judicial re-
view on the merits. And for the government, it has led to shifting and
unpredictable constitutional parameters within which to wage a serious
fight against a dangerous enemy.
CONCLUSION
The lesson, to my mind, in the Court's allergy to clear substantive rules
of decision and its embrace, instead, of multi-variant balancing tests capa-
ble of responding to the largely unprecedented and ever-changing factual
reality that defines the current fight against transnational terrorism, is
that many of the bright-line assumptions undergirding our traditional
substantive rules have deteriorated. It would be nothing new to say that
traditional concepts of war, territoriality and sovereignty have become
fuzzier and more fluid. Consequently, traditional substantive rules built
on those concepts have also become fuzzier and more fluid.
There has been heated talk about whether the war against terror is
better conceptualized as straight warfare, to be dealt with under a mili-
tary paradigm, 31 or whether it is better conceptualized as a criminal law
enforcement problem-albeit of far more expansive scope than tradi-
tional initiatives-but nonetheless to be dealt with primarily under a
criminal law paradigm. 32 Others have called for a "new paradigm," fitted
to the new challenges we face.33 What we may be seeing from the Court
is a push in that direction: not the minting of a ready-made new paradigm
setting out a clean and definite ex ante framework of substantive rules;
but rather the messier, yet certainly more responsive, analytical apparatus
with which to begin the project-to start the legal conversation.
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